Investors with limited attention have an incentive to focus on summary statistics rather than individual pieces of information. We use this observation to form a test of the impact of limited attention on the aggregate stock market. We examine the market response to a macro economic release that is purely a summary statistic, the U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI). Consistent with the limited attention hypothesis, we show that the LEI announcement has an impact on aggregate stock returns, return volatility, and trading volume. Furthermore, we …nd that the response to the LEI is higher for stocks which inattentive investors are more likely to trade.
Introduction
For most investors, the costs of processing all relevant information are prohibitively high. As such, these investors can be viewed as having limited attention. Previous studies provide evidence suggesting that investors' limited attention is important for the pricing of individual securities (see, e.g., DellaVigna and Pollet (2006), Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2006), Huberman and Regev (2001) ). In this paper, we ask whether limited attention also has an impact on the aggregate stock market.
To answer this question, we examine how the release of summary statistics a¤ect the market. Barberis and Schleifer (2003) and Peng and Xiong (2006) highlight that investors with limited attention economize on information processing by grouping stocks into categories. In the same spirit, investors with limited attention may choose to focus on summary statistics instead of attending to every individual piece of information. This implication of limited attention has not, to our knowledge, been tested in the previous literature.
The summary statistic we identify is the Conference Board's U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI). This index is designed to track business cycle ‡uctuations and signal turning points in the business cycle. Thus, it is economically relevant as it contains information about future cash ‡ows and discount rates, and it has a leading relationship relative to macroeconomic aggregates such as output and employment. Importantly, the index aggregates data that is already publicly available and is released monthly on a pre-determined day at a pre-determined time.
Our null hypothesis is that there should be no market reaction to the announcements of the index since 1) the LEI is based on previously released data, 2) the components and methodology of the LEI are readily available to the public, and 3) the index is fairly easy to reproduce. These are well-known facts, publicized among other places on the Conference Board's internet page and Bloomberg. 1 Thus, it is possible to calculate the change in the index before its release. However, if limited attention is important for the aggregate stock market, the information in the LEI would be news to investors and as such have a market impact. Further, if this market impact is caused by limited attention, we would expect to …nd a larger response among stocks in which investors subject to this bias are more likely to trade. Looking at intraday data over 72 announcement days over the period 1997-2005, we …nd that the release of the LEI is associated with measures of information arrival such as market returns, return volatility, and trading volume. The market return is positively related to the changes in the LEI; a one standard deviation increase in the LEI on average leads to a 3.5 basis-point increase in the subsequent 5-minute market returns. Aggregate return volatility and trading volume increase by 25% and 7%, respectively, following the announcement. The volatility increase is signi…cant for the 5-minute interval following the announcement, while the volume increase persists for the subsequent 30 minutes. The absolute level of the return response is fairly low. However, this result is expected given that limited attention should a¤ect markets less if the information is market-wide, as is the case here (see Peng and Xiong (2006) ); investors have a higher incentive to be attentive to information that is more important for their utility, and as a group investors therefore focus more on market-wide information. Further, since the release is recurring and replicable, one would expect attentive arbitrageurs to eliminate pro…t opportunities arising from the release up to transaction costs. Therefore, the tests in this paper are stacked against the limited attention alternative hypothesis. Our results are thus consistent with both limited attention on the part of a subset of market participants and market e¢ ciency imposed by information gathering incentives and arbitrageurs.
To examine the robustness of the results we test another hypothesis. If the market impact of the LEI announcements are caused by limited attention of a subset of investors, we would expect to …nd a larger impact on stocks which investors subject to this bias are likely to trade. We test this conjecture by looking at the cross-sectional return response to the LEI release. Inattention-prone investors are more likely to trade large capitalization stocks, which have high volume and are featured more in the news, as noted by Barber and Odean (2005) , and 'glamour stocks'(see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ), which have high market to book ratios. Thus, limited attention suggests that large and high book to market stocks should respond more strongly to the release of the LEI. We construct intraday returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios on the announcement days and show that, consistent with the limited attention e¤ect, the returns of large and low book-to-market stocks respond more to the LEI announcements, compared to small capitalization and high book-to-market stocks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use in this paper. Section 3 presents the aggregate stock market results, while Section 4 presents the cross-sectional results. We conclude in Section 5.
The Data
In this study, we combine three di¤erent data sources: macro news, intraday index prices and individual stock transactions. The LEI release dates and index series were provided by The Conference Board. It is important to note that we use the original release series which were available to investors at the time since subsequent revisions to macro data resulted in ex-post updates of the index. In our sample (1/1997 -8/2005 ), the index is always reported at 10:00am. 2 The market returns data are constructed using S&P500 future prices, while the cross-sectional analysis uses individual stock transactions data from the TAQ database. The futures data were purchased from Price-Data.com and includes …ve minute interval data on open, high, low and close prices for each of the futures contacts traded between 1997 and 2005. 3 For each date, we determined which of the multiple contracts available are "on the run" by comparing their daily volume. The intraday return series for each day were calculated using prices from that day's "on the run" contract. Since aggregate intraday volume data were not readily available, we constructed them by gathering tick-by-tick data from TAQ for all …rms that were in the S&P500 index on a given day. We added transactions across all …rms for each 5 minute interval to arrive at the market volume for that time period.
In addition, we use data from the Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), National Association of Purchasing Managers (NAPM), and Conference Board, to screen out all dates on which other macro announcements were released between 9:30am and 10:30am. Speci…cally, we screen out dates on which one of the following announcements were made: New Home Sales, Durable Goods Orders, Factory Orders, Construction Spending, Business Inventories, Consumer Con…dence Index, NAPM Index and Target Federal Funds Rate. These announcements were identi…ed by Anderson et al. (2005) as being most important for U.S. equity returns. 4 
The Leading Economic Index
The Composite Index of Leading Economic Indicators (LEI), calculated and published monthly by The Conference Board (TCB), is designed to predict turning points (peaks and troughs) in the business cycle. TCB took over the responsibility to publish and maintain 2 Before 1997, the index was reported at 8:30am, which coincides with the reporting time for a number of other macro economic releases (e.g., Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis). The move to the 10:00am announcement time re ‡ected in part a desire to make the announcement during market open hours. 3 Other data …elds includes trading volume and open interests. 4 See Leading indicators are high frequency series that have an established tendency to decline before recessions and rise before recoveries (for more details on the indicator approach to measuring and analyzing business cycles see Burns and Mitchell (1946) and Zarnowitz (1992) ). 5 For instance, new orders for machinery and equipment are placed well before investment plans are completed. By design, the LEI should help predict changes in real economic activity. Figure 1 shows that the LEI systematically declines ahead of the recessions dated by the NBER. Filardo (2004) provides evidence that the LEI performs well as a variable to forecast cyclical movements in the economy. McGuckin et al. (2007) also report evidence on the signi…cant out-of-sample forecasting ability of the LEI.
After The Conference Board assumed responsibility for the Business Cycle Indicators program, it reviewed and revised the LEI in 1996. Notably, the composition of the LEI was changed: two components were deleted due to their excessive volatility which led to "false signals" of recessions and a new component was added (the Interest Rate spread). After this major revision (…rst released December 30, 1996) , The Conference Board also started to publish the LEI press release at 10:00am EST to be consistent with its other economic data releases. Previously, the LEI releases were made at 8:30am, following the BEA schedule.
In the current indexing methodology, which changed very little since the 1960s when the U.S. Department of Commerce began publishing composite indexes, the volatility of each component is standardized before the component contributions are averaged together, using equal weights. This adjustment is made so that relatively more volatile series do not exert undue in ‡uence on the index (the standardization factors are updated every year in January and are available in the monthly press releases). The average contribution becomes the monthly change in the LEI. Using this monthly change, the index level is calculated recursively starting from a value of 100 in January 1959, and it is normalized to have an average value of 100 in 1996.
Seven of the ten indicators used every month in the LEI calculation are available at least 24 hours before each release. The monthly values of the three remaining components which are not available on the publication date are based on estimates by TCB. These components (Manufacturers'New Orders for Consumer Goods and Materials, Manufacturers'New Orders The shaded areas represent U.S. busines cycle recessions as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The numbers at the P and T markings denote the leads or lags in months at the business cycle peaks and troughs respectively. for Nondefense Capital Goods, and the personal consumption expenditure de ‡ator used to get real Money Supply (M2)) are estimated using a simple AR(2) time series regression. 6 The Appendix provides more background information and details on why this procedure was selected and how it was implemented by TCB.
Market Level Results
This section presents the impact of the LEI announcements on aggregate measures of information arrival: stock returns, return volatility and trading volume. Our null hypothesis is that the LEI announcements have no e¤ect. We focus on intraday market activity for two reasons. First, previous research has shown that the e¤ect of news on aggregate stock market prices are mainly manifested in intraday returns data (see Andersen et al. (2003 Andersen et al. ( , 2007 ). Second, focusing on intraday returns makes our study less sensitive to the presence of other news e¤ects over the same day (including the time from the close the day before) that we may not have captured in our econometric speci…cation. Over the course of any given 24 hour period there is a continuous ‡ow of news. By narrowing the time-window, we minimize the likelihood of the results being contaminated by other, unidenti…ed shocks to investors' information sets.
General Methodology
A …rst-order concern when evaluating intraday data is the well-known presence of intraday patterns in volatility and volume (e.g., Admati and P ‡eiderer (1988) ). Rather than attempt a parametric model to describe such intraday patterns, for which at present there is no agreed upon model, we investigate return, volatility and volume patterns on LEI announcement days vs. non-announcement days by utilizing a matching study. This allows us to control for both intraday and day-of-the-week e¤ects. Speci…cally, we match each announcement date with the one week ahead non-announcement date, unless there was another important macro news release on that date, in which case we picked the date following the LEI release. Out of a total of 104 announcements in our sample (1/1997 -8/2005 ), we exclude 30 due to the presence of other simultaneous macro announcements and 2 since the intraday future prices were not available for every 5 minutes in the 9:30-10:30 time interval (see Section 3.5 for results including all announcements days).
We evaluate the aggregate return, volatility and volume of announcement days versus non-announcement days over di¤erent 5-minute intervals around the time of announcement to investigate dynamic e¤ects. The LEI release is at 10:00 throughout the sample, and we focus on the 9:30 to 10:30 interval. 7 Anderson et al. (2003) note that looking at 5-minute futures returns strikes a good balance between capturing fundamental dynamics operating at high-frequencies and minimizing the noise in returns caused by bid-ask bounce and other microstructure issues. The futures contracts on the S&P500 are very liquid, so empirically neither stale prices nor the bid-ask bounce are important issues for our purposes. Further, this approach allows us to compare our results with those obtained in similar studies. For all intervals, we test whether there is a return response at the time of the announcement and whether volatility and volume are di¤erent on announcement versus non-announcement days.
Returns
In this section, we investigate the e¤ect of the LEI announcement on S&P500 futures'returns. We …rst de…ne the normalized change in the LEI index, LEI t , as
where E T [ ] and T ( ) denote the sample mean and standard deviation, respectively. We make this normalization for two reasons: 1) it makes the interpretation of regression coe¢ cients more intuitive, and 2) it makes the results easier to compare to related studies where such normalizations are used (such as Andersen et al. (2003) and Lyons and Evans (2005)). 8 It is usual to subtract the conditional expectation of the release and divide by the standard deviation of the imputed shocks. However, since our index is replicable, there are no well-de…ned "shocks". Therefore, we simply consider deviations from the sample mean. We run the regression
where R A i;t is the intraday interval i's log return on the announcement day t. Thus, if the 8 interval i is before 10:00, the regressor is the same-day future percentage change in the LEI index, whereas if the interval i is after 10:00, the regressor is the same day's already reported LEI change. For comparison, we also run the regression
where the superscript N A refers to the non-announcement day t 0 , which corresponds to the matched announcement day t. Table 1 presents the results. The regression coe¢ cients for the 5-minute intervals before the announcement (from 9:30 -10:00) are on average positive, but insigni…cant. The regression coe¢ cients on nonannouncement days are also insigni…cant and on average half as big as the case for the announcement days. At the announcement (interval 10:00 -10:05), the announcement day regression coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level, while the non-announcement day regression coe¢ cient is about a quarter in magnitude and insigni…cant. Thus, the LEI announcement is moving aggregate stock prices in the direction of the change in the LEI index: A one standard deviation change in the LEI on average gives a 3.5bp return response on the S&P500 futures. Over the remaining 25 minutes of the event window, there are no signi…cant e¤ects. However, all the announcement day regression coe¢ cients are negative, indicating that prices revert somewhat after the initial reaction at 10:00. For the non-announcement days, there are no signi…cant e¤ects and the average of the regression coe¢ cients is essentially zero.
Economic Signi…cance
Benchmarking Against Major Macro News Announcements. The return response documented in the previous section may seem small in magnitude. However, when compared to major macro economic news announcements such as Non-Farm Payroll and New Home Sales, the response is economically signi…cant. Figure 2 shows the response of 5-minute returns to the LEI announcement next to the statistically signi…cant 5-minute return responses to macro economic news announcements taken from Andersen et al. (2005) . 9 As Figure 2 9 Andersen et al. (2007) investigate all macro releases including the LEI, but do not …nd signi…cant evidence that it has a price impact. We o¤er two explanations for the discrepancy between our results. First, in their table 4, they state that the LEI is released at 8:30am. This is true only for the beginning of their sample. In our sample, from 1997 and onwards, the release time is always at 10:00am. At present we do not know if the authors corrected the change in release time over the sample, but they give no indication in their paper that they do. Second, and more fundamentally, they investigate normalized "surprises"based on market estimates obtain from a survey database (MMS). But, as we discussed in section 3, it is unclear shows, the response to the LEI announcement is as big as for true news announcements such as New Home Sales and Net Exports. It is about 30% of the CPI announcement and 25% of the macro economic announcement that gives the largest return response (Non-Farm Payroll).
Cumulative Returns Assessment. To further assess the economic signi…cance of the return-predictability, we construct a simple trading strategy based on the change in the LEI index. The strategy initiates a buy (sell) of S&P 500 index futures at the open prices on the day of the announcement in the direction of the change in the index. The amount transacted is proportional to the absolute value of the (known) change, maxed out at 0.4. Therefore, if the change in the LEI index on date t is 0.2, the strategy initiates a buy of $0:2. At 10:05, the position is reversed. Notice that this is a conservative strategy. An alternative, more aggressive strategy, would initiate the trades immediately before 10:00 and reverse them at 10:05, resulting in what these "shocks" represent since the index is perfectly forecastable. lower volatility of pro…ts. Further, volume at the open and right after the announcement is relatively high so there is good reason to believe that these hypothetical trades might have been feasible. At the same time, we do not claim that in practice this strategy would have been pro…table as we do not account for trading costs. The purpose of this exercise is simply to obtain a measure of the economic size of the apparent informational ine¢ ciency.
Aggregating the results across the 72 observations, we …nd that the strategy yields a cumulative return of 1:87% with corresponding standard deviation of 9:7%, while the results obtained from running the same hypothetical trades on the matching non-announcement days yield a cumulative return of 0:7% and standard deviation of 9:6%.
10 Therefore, the Sharpe ratio obtained from announcement days is at least 2:4 times the Sharpe ratio obtained from trading on matched non-announcement days.
Volatility
In this section, we test whether 5-minute stock return volatility is higher on announcement days compared to non-announcement days in each of the 5-minute intervals in the hour around the announcement. As mentioned, it is well-documented that aggregate stock return volatility is time-varying. To control for this, we employ a matching study. First, we calculate the volatility of 5-minute returns for each non-announcement day for the relevant trading hour. Next, we divide the 5-minute returns on both the corresponding announcement day and the non-announcement day by this volatility measure. 11 We use only the non-announcement days'volatility in order to capture any overall higher levels of volatility on announcement days in the subsequent volatility tests. This normalization is valid under the null hypothesis that the volatility over matched announcement and non-announcement days are equal. Next, we calculate the volatility of 5-minute (normalized) announcement and non-announcement day returns for each interval as follows. LetR i;t be the normalized 5-minute log return for the interval i, where we have i 2 f9 : 30 9 : 35; 9 : 35 9 : 40; :::; 10 : 25 10 : 30g. Interval i's variance estimate is then^ where the subscript t corresponds to the announcement or non-announcement days in our sample, which are indexed 1 to 72. To test whether the variance on announcement days is di¤erent than on non-announcement days we apply a Levene F-test for each interval i. Table 2 shows the results.
12
The ratios of announcement vs. non-announcement days'volatility exhibits a signi…cant spike for the interval 10 : 00 10 : 05, which corresponds to the time the LEI index is announced. The increase is not only statistically signi…cant (at the 5% level), but also economically sizable -volatility increases by an average of 25%. Before 10:00, there appears to be no overall pattern in the volatility ratio: volatility is about the same on announcement vs. non-announcement days. There is one statistically signi…cant observation at 9:35-9:40 for which announcement days seem to have lower volatility than non-announcement days. After 10:00, the volatility ratios are all above 1, indicating that volatility is overall higher on announcement days in the half hour following the LEI release.
Volume
In this section, we test whether volume is higher on announcement days compared to nonannouncement days in each of the 5-minute intervals in the hour around the announcement. To control for the strong increase in aggregate volume over the sample period and the well known intraday patterns in volume, we create normalized 5-minute volume for each announcement day, v i;t , by dividing the volume of the same 5-minute interval on the matched non-announcement day:
volume 5 min interval i on announcement day t volume 5 min interval i on non-announcement day t 0 :
We then regress this normalized volume on a constant for each 5-minute interval from market open at 9:30 until 10:30: 
The null hypothesis we are testing is = 1. Column 3 of Table 2 reports the results. At market open the volume on non-announcement days is slightly higher than on non- announcement days, but the di¤erence is insigni…cant. However, as we get closer to the 10:00 announcement, the volume ratio becomes larger than unity and statistically signi…cant following the announcement, as it was for both returns and volatility. The volume e¤ect, however, persists signi…cantly throughout the half hour following the announcement.
Robustness
To examine the robustness of the results, we repeat the same analysis on the full set of announcement days. Recall that we initially excluded days on which other macro announcements (including Federal Open Market Committee meetings) were released. The full sample consists of 102 announcement days in the sample period January 1997 to August 2005. If the full sample is a¤ected by the presence of other macro announcements, we would expect to …nd a weaker return response but a stronger volatility and volume responses to the LEI announcements.
We …nd that the LEI announcement has very similar impact on aggregate stock market returns, volatility and volume, compared with the …ltered sample. Speci…cally, we …nd that the return response at the time of the announcement (10:00-10:05) is positively related to the change in the LEI, although the coe¢ cient is slightly smaller (0:028) and its statistical signi…cance is weaker (t-statistic of 1:74). This is to be expected as the other announcements are imperfectly correlated with changes in the LEI index and therefore add noise.
In contrast to the return tests which depend on the sign of the announcement, volatility and volume depend on the presence of announcements. Indeed, we …nd that volatility increases by 28% following the announcement, which is stronger than for the …ltered sample (25%) where the LEI is the only announcement that occurs. The same applies to trading volume. It increases by 8:8% following the announcement for the full sample, relative to only 6:8% in the …ltered sample.
Discussion of Aggregate Results
In sum, we show that the LEI announcements have a signi…cant impact on aggregate proxies of information arrival such as returns, return volatility, and trading volume. The e¤ect is short-lived for returns and volatility, consistent with previous studies of the impact of news announcements on aggregate prices. Volume, however, exhibits a more prolonged reaction. These …ndings are consistent with the presence of investors with limited attention, who …nd it optimal to focus on summary statistics as opposed to the individual components of the index.
The absolute level of the return response is fairly low. However, this result is expected given that limited attention should a¤ect markets less if the information is market-wide, as is the case here (see Peng and Xiong (2006) ); investors have a higher incentive to be attentive to information that is more important for their utility, and as a group investors therefore focus more on market-wide information. Further, since the release is recurring and replicable, one would expect attentive arbitrageurs to eliminate pro…t opportunities arising from the release up to transaction costs. Therefore, the tests in this paper are stacked against the limited attention alternative hypothesis. Our results are thus consistent with both limited attention on the part of a subset of market participants and market e¢ ciency imposed by information gathering incentives and arbitrageurs.
Cross-Sectional Test
In the previous section, we showed that the release of the LEI has a statistically signi…cant impact on aggregate returns, volatility, and volume. To examine the robustness of the results we test another hypothesis. If the market impact of the LEI announcements are caused by limited attention of a subset of investors, we would expect to …nd a larger impact on stocks which investors subject to this bias are likely to trade. We test this conjecture by looking at the cross-sectional return response to the LEI release. Inattention-prone investors are more likely to trade large capitalization stocks, which have high volume and are featured more in the news, as noted by Barber and Odean (2005) , and 'glamour stocks'(see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ), which have low book-to-market ratios. Thus, limited attention suggests that large capitalization and low book-to-market ratio stocks should respond more strongly to the release of the LEI. We construct intraday returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios on the announcement days and show that, consistent with the limited attention e¤ect, the returns of large and low book-to-market stocks respond more to the LEI announcements, compared to small and high book-to-market stocks.
Portfolio Construction
Andersen et al. (2003) suggest that markets respond to macro information very rapidly. In light of that suggestion and in order to increase the power of our tests, we use 1-minute returns constructed from tick data on individual stocks. Following the procedure described in Davis, Fama, and French (2000), we obtain the CUSIP numbers of the stocks in each of the 25 portfolios for every month from 1997 to 2005.
13 Using these data, we then extract from the Trade and Quotes (TAQ) database the transactions of every stock in each portfolio from 9:30 until 10:30 on the LEI announcement days. Calculation of portfolio returns using tick-by-tick data poses a challenge since many stocks do not trade frequently. As a result, we use the following algorithm. For the time interval (e.g., 10:00 to 10:01), a stock's return is calculated if it traded during that minute and during the preceding minute (9:59 to 10:00). If a stock trades multiple times during both minutes, we use the latest trades in both minutes in order to calculate the return. All the stocks that do not trade during either or both minutes are disregarded. The portfolio return is the equally-weighted return of all the stocks'returns that did trade between these two minutes. Thus, our testing procedure is not a¤ected by stale prices.
Some summary statistics for all 25 portfolios are shown in Table 4 in the Appendix. It is worth pointing out that the average numbers of stocks in our portfolios are consistent with the data provided by Ken French on the daily 5x5 portfolios. Also, note that none of the portfolios have very few stocks trading during the minute when the LEI announcements are made: the minimum is 20 stocks and that is in the large size portfolios, where there is ample liquidity and each stock trades frequently. In the small size portfolios, which might be most subject to liquidity and stale price problems, there are always enough stocks trading between 10:00 and 10:01, the minimum being 54. Lastly, we highlight the fact that the average 1-minute returns during the event window (9:30 to 10:30) are not statistically di¤erent from zero across all portfolios, which gives us con…dence that these high-frequency returns are not biased in any particular way.
Tests and Results
The limited attention hypothesis implies that large and low B/M stocks should have a higher announcement e¤ect compared to small and high B/M stocks. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the intradaily 5 5 Fama-French portfolio returns described above and we perform exactly the same return tests as in the previous section, regressing the return of each portfolio from 10:00 to 10:01 on the normalized change in the LEI: R i;10:00 10:01 = i + i LEI t + " i;t for all 72 dates in our sample (5) where R i;10:00 10:01 is the return of portfolio i from 10:00 to 10:01. Table 3 shows the results from the above regressions. Three main results emerge from this analysis. First, coe¢ cients are positive for almost all portfolios, consistent with the aggregate results presented in the previous section. Second, for each B/M quintile, as size increases, the regression coe¢ cient i becomes larger, i.e. a larger announcement e¤ect. For instance for the medium B/M category (3), the coe¢ cient goes from being negative and insigni…cant for small size to being equal to 0.0243% for large size. This pattern is present in four of the …ve B/M quintiles, and appears to be stronger as B/M decreases. We further highlight this size-pattern by constructing aggregate size portfolios by summing the returns across all B/M categories (i.e. summing across the rows). This gives us …ve portfolios sorted only on size. We run the same regressions as before on these …ve portfolios. The results are shown in the last column of Table 3 (All B/M) and also in Figure 3 . The results are clear and signi…cant: as size increases, the portfolios react more and more to the release of the LEI.
The third pattern that emerges from Table 3 is that, as B/M increases, the regression coe¢ cient i decreases, i.e. the LEI announcement e¤ect is lower. This B/M-result is present for the three largest size quintiles (3, 4, and B) and is strongest for the largest size quintile (B), where the coe¢ cient decreases from 0.0305% to 0.0184% as B/M increases. As before, we further highlight this e¤ect by creating …ve single-sort portfolios (All Sizes) by summing the returns across size quintiles. We run the same regression as before on these …ve portfolios sorted on B/M only and the results are shown on the last row of Table 3 (All Sizes) and also in Figure 4 . The B/M e¤ect is weaker than the size e¤ect, but the evidence suggests that low B/M (growth stocks) have higher responses to the release of the LEI than high B/M (value stocks). In sum, large capitalization and low book-to-market stocks respond more strongly to the LEI announcement. These are also the stocks that retail investors, who are more likely to be prone to a limited attention bias, trade the most (Barber and Odean (2005)).
Liquidity, Bid-Ask Spreads and the Bid-Ask Bounce
Could the cross-sectional results be explained by di¤erences in liquidity across the portfolios? After all, spreads and bid-ask bounce are higher for small market capitalization stocks. We argue that this would lead us to over-reject the null. To see that, consider a day with a positive LEI announcement. Since prices respond to the announcement, we are likely to observe an increase in orders executed at the ask price. For small stocks, which have large bid-ask spread, the bid-ask bounce would generate "extra" returns compared to large stocks that have smaller bid-ask spreads. As a result, e¤ects related to bid-ask spreads and bounce go against our results.
Another possible explanation for the lower observed announcement response for small stocks is that they are more illiquid compared to large stocks. However, in the construction of the 1-minute returns to the 25 Fama-French portfolios, we only take into account the stocks that trade in both the 9:59 -10:00 minute and the 10:00-10:01 minute. As a result, stale prices are not an issue for the portfolio returns we construct. In addition, we document in Table 4 in the appendix that there are many stocks trading in each portfolio, so the announcement returns are based on well-diversi…ed portfolios.
Conclusion
In this paper we present evidence that investors act on summary information, impacting even aggregate stock market returns, volatility and volume. The paper uses a weak restriction on aggregate prices to test for the presence of limited investor attention: Markets should not respond to the release of summary statistics that are based on information already available. We identify a unique stream of releases, the U.S. Leading Economic Index (LEI), that is released on an ongoing basis at pre-determined times, consists of previously published macro data, is calculated using a publicly available methodology, and is widely followed by the mass media. We show that this series has statistically signi…cant e¤ects on proxies for information arrival such as instantaneous market-level returns (which move in the direction of the announcement), return volatility and trading volume.
Since the test pertains to aggregate information, the e¤ects of limited attention on re-turns should be constrained by information gathering incentives and arbitrageurs. Peng and Xiong (2006) show that investors with a limited attention budget choose to expend a larger fraction of their resources on aggregate information, such as the index constituents of the LEI. Further, since the LEI is released every month at a pre-determined time and date, it is relatively easy for arbitrageurs to pro…t from a market return reaction to its release. Therefore, if investors su¤er from limited attention, the market return impact should still be small, which is what we …nd. However, the other proxies for the arrival of information, volatility of volume, increase substantially following the announcement. Thus, the evidence provided in this paper indicates that summary statistics like the LEI are valuable to a signi…cant fraction of investors, even though the information provided is technically stale. More broadly, this suggests a role for other summaries of information such as the ones provided by the …nancial press (e.g., Meschke (2004) ).
Appendix: LEI Calculation
Let LEI t;t 1 denote the monthly change in the LEI for month t 1 published in month t. This monthly change is calculated as the sum of component contributions which are derived from a symmetric percent change formula:
where i is the standardization factor calculated by dividing the inverse standard deviation of component i by the sum of the inverse standard deviations over all components. As the notation makes clear, the index published in month t refers to past data for t 1 which has already been published.
Since January 2001, leading indicator components for month t 1 that are not available at the time of publication, month t, are estimated by The Conference Board using a univariate autoregressive model to forecast each unavailable component. This procedure seeks to address the problem of varying availability in its components (i.e. publication lags). Without it, the index would contain incomplete components or it would not be available promptly under the current schedule.
In the publication schedule prior to January 2001, the index published in month t referred to the month t 2. In the new schedule after January 2001, the index published in month t refers to the preceding month t 1 (this information is available from The Conference Board). For example, in the old publication schedule the index would be calculated in the …rst week of March (t) for January (t 2), and the January value of the LEI would use a complete set of components. According the new schedule, the index is calculated in the third week of March for February (t 1), and the February value of the index uses 70% of the components which are already available and remaining 30% are forecast. As seen in this example, users of the LEI would have had to wait for two more weeks until April for the February index.
Speci…cally, the missing components (Manufacturers'New Orders for Consumer Goods and Materials, Manufacturers'New Orders for Nondefense Capital Goods, and the personal consumption expenditure used to de ‡ate the Money Supply (M2) are estimated using a time series regression that uses two lags (see McGuckin et al. (2001) for more on this model and a comparison with other alternative lags structures).
14 When the unavailable data become available in the next month, the index is revised. The missing components could be forecast through alternative means. However, The Conference Board has focused on simplicity, stability, and low costs of production and argues for concentrating on easily implemented autoregressive model. Note that under the pre-2001 release schedule of the LEI, it would have been possible to perfectly forecast the new value each month if the costs of data collection and application of the index methodology calculation were undertaken. In the post-2001 schedule, this is still possible, but the estimated components require an additional step.
in the calculation of real money supply and commercial and industrial loans outstanding) incorporates the current month's consumer price index when it is available before the release of the U.S. Leading Economic Indicators. Table 4 : For each of the 25 Fama-French portfolios, we report the average 1-minute returns r over the hour from 9:30 to 10:30 along with the respective standard deviations of returns . We also report the average number of stocks in each portfolio N portf olio and the average number of stocks N t;LEI trading from 10:00 to 10:01 in each portfolio. All these summary statistics are for our entire dataset of 72 dates spanning from February 1997 to August 2005. Note that the idiosyncratic nature of the returns and standard deviations of portfolio 10 seem to be due to an error in the TAQ data that we are investigating. Nevertheless, we can con…rm that this potential error does not occur between 10:00 and 10:01.
